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NOTES
egation of "police" power would be perfectly in line with such a
policy. The broader interpretation actually given the delegation of
control over local waters by the First Circuit would appear to make
the grant unconstitutional.
X
DEFICIENCY COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW
Ordinarily, when an employee, injured in the course of em-
ployment, receives reparation outside of the Workmen's Compensation
Law from the party responsible for such injuries, he is entitled to
any deficiency between the amount he received and that to which
he would be entitled as a compensation award.' Exceptions arise,
however, where the circumstances surrounding the collateral re-
covery preclude the employee, or his dependents in case of death,
from receiving deficiency compensation. One such instance is when
the employee accepts a compromise or settlement of a cause of action
against a third party tortfeasor without first receiving the consent of
the employer or carrier liable for compensation payments.&2 The
theory of a denial of deficiency compensation in such a case is that
the actions of the employee have prejudiced the subrogation rights
of the employer or the carrier against the third party. Deficiency
awards are also denied when an employee successfully terminates an
action against the employer while his right to a compensation award
is uncertain.3 Denial in the latter instance is founded on the premise
that the employee should not be permitted to maintain inconsistent
actions.
It is the purpose of this article to outline the New York statu-
tory provisions and to examine the merits of preventing an injured
employee from receiving deficiency compensation in the situations
mentioned above. Particular concern will be given to those instances
where an injured employee has, by some means outside the com-
pensation law, received a sum less than the injury would have
rated as compensation and seeks to recover the difference.
not the same as that of a State in the Federal Union, though both have in
common complete powers of local self-government. . . . On balance, the
Puerto Ricans justly feel that the status of the island . . . though different
from that of a State of the Union, is one of no less dignity." Id. at 19-20.
I See note 47 infra and accompanying text.
2 See note 49 infra and accompanying text.
3 See text accompanying note 101 infra.
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Third Party Suits
In New York, Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Law
governs the rights of the employee and the person or organization
liable for the payment of compensation awards as against third party
tortfeasors through whose negligence or wrong an employee has been
injured in the course of employment. The statute, as enacted in
1913, required an injured employee to elect whether to proceed
at law against the third party or submit a claim for compensation
under the Act.4 Through acceptance of a compensation award, the
employee automatically assigned his cause of action against the third
party to the compensation payor; the latter could then proceed
against the third party, subject only to the payment over of any
recovery in excess of the compensation award to the injured em-
ployee. 5  Should the employee proceed at law against the third
party, he would thereby be precluded from submitting a claim for
compensation unless the judgment was less than that to which he
would otherwise be entitled as compensation, in which case he would
ordinarily be entitled to the deficiency. 6 Since 1937, however, the
employee has no longer been obligated to make such a binding
election, and has been entitled under the statute to collect com-
pensation and still maintain an action at law against the third
party, the recovery at law being subject to a carrier's lien for the
amount of compensation paid. 7 The employee is given preference
4 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1913, ch. 816, § 29.
5 Lunn v. Andrews, 152 Misc. 568, 274 N.Y. Supp. 432 (Sup. Ct. 1934),
aff'd mern., 243 App. Div. 654, 277 N.Y. Supp. 750 (3d Dep't), aff'd inero.,
268 N.Y. 538, 198 N.E. 393 (1935).
The effect of § 29 in assigning the cause of action to the carrier is not
to guarantee the collection of damages. The assigned cause may be valueless
because of the contributory negligence of the employee, an inability on the
part of the assignee to establish the negligence of the third party, financial
irresponsibility of the third person, or conduct which is tortious where the
compensation contract is enforceable is not tortious in the forum where the
accident occurred. See Heaney v. P. J. Carlin Constr. Co., 269 N.Y. 93, 103,
199 N.E. 16, 20 (1935), aff'd, 299 U.S. 41 (1936).6 Egan v. Otis Elevator Co., 209 App. Div. 332, 204 N.Y. Supp. 516
(3d Dep't 1924). When the employee settles a third party action with the
carrier's consent, the employer and carrier are liable only for the deficiency
between the amount actually collected and the compensation provided under
the statute. Maurin v. Henry Baumgard, Inc., 240 App. Div. 292, 270 N.Y.
Supp. 184 (3d Dep't 1934). See Curtin v. New York, 287 N.Y. 338, 39
N.E.2d 903 (1942).
7 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 684, §§ 29, 227. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP .
LAw § 227 provides that the carrier shall have a lien on the proceeds of an
employee's third party recovery, whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise,
after the deduction of reasonable and necessary expenditures, including at-
torney's fees, to the extent of disability benefits paid. See Borgio v. Hegeman
Farms Corp., 287 N.Y. 747, 40 N.E.2d 35 (1942) (memorandum decision);
Matter of Applebaum, 180 Misc. 881, 41 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
[ VOL. 35
NOTES
in proceeding against the third party by a provision granting the
employee, or his dependents in case of death, a six month period
after receipt of the compensation award 8 in which to bring an action
against the third party.9 In any event, the employee must bring
the action within one year' 0 from the time the cause of action
accrues; if he fails to do so, the action will be automatically assigned
to the person or organization liable for compensation payments.'"
Pursuant to a 1951 amendment,' 2 however, the latter party is re-
quired to provide the employee with thirty days notice of the ex-
piration of the period for the assignment to become effective.13
Neither assignment nor subrogation vests greater rights in the carrier
than those of the original party in interest.'
4
8 It would be an unwarranted interpretation of the statute to allow auto-
matic assignment of the cause of action although the award was not paid
by an uninsured and insolvent employer. Juba v. General Builders Supply
Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 48, 163 N.E.2d 328, 194 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1959).
9 N.Y. WORKMEN'S Com!P. LAW § 29(2). The claimant's time to com-
mence the third party action should be computed from the date of notice
of the award. Weingarten v. Cohen & Cohen, 275 App* Div. 253, 89
N.Y.S.2d 356 (1st Dep't), aff'd mere., 300 N.Y. 528, 89 N.E.2d 251 (1949).
But see Werkley v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., 111 F.Supp.
300, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
Any instrument by which an employee, as a prerequisite to employment,
agrees not to maintain a common-law action against a specified third party
in the event of injury is void. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cochran, 302 N.Y.
545, 99 N.E.2d 882 (1951).
'0 Section 29 was not intended to shorten the statute of limitations for
negligence actions. Among other things, the section was intended to define
who, during the normal statutory period, should be entitled to bring the action
against the third party. Grossman v. Consolidated Edison Co., 268 App. Div.
875, 50 N.Y.S.2d 785 (2d Dep't 1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 39, 60 N.E.2d 199
(1945).
11 A cause of action in negligence may not be assigned except by operation
of law, as provided in § 29. Crawford v. O'Sullivan, 19 Misc. 2d 867, 189
N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Six months after a compensation award and upon the expiration of one
year, the cause of action becomes assigned by operation of law to the com-
pensation payor. Taylor v. New York Central R.R., 294 N.Y. 397, 62
N.E.2d 777, motion for reargutnent denied, 294 N.Y. 977, 63 N.E.2d 711
(1945); see Skakady v. Wreckers & Excavators, Inc., 274 App. Div. 220,
81 N.Y.S.2d 841 (3d Dep't 1948), aff'd mine., 298 N.Y. 888, 84 N.E2d 805
(1949). Once the action is assigned to the carrier, it can not be reassigned
to the injured employee. Ruopoli v. Geraci & Castagna, Inc., 140 N.Y.S2d
464 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
12 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 527, § 29.
"13 Tormey v. City of New York, 6 Misc. 2d 654, 168 N.Y.S.2d 296 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1957). See Robinson v. River Esplanade Corp., 137 N.Y.S.2d 382
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
14 Exchange Mut. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co.,
243 N.Y. 75, 152 N.E. 470 (1926). Where the representative of a deceased
employee failed to file a timely claim against the City of New York, the
carrier is also barred from maintaining the action upon assignment. Cresci
v. Mike Krasilowsky Trucking Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 569, 172 N.Y.S.2d 322
(3d Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 4 N.Y.2d 677 (1958).
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Generally, a recovery against a third party is greater in amount
than that to which the employee would be entitled under the Work-
men's Compensation Law. This is partly because the measure of
damages is greater, including the loss of actual wages, the value of
pain and suffering, the cost of medical care, and other factors. If
the employee maintains the action, he is entitled to retain the entire
excess over the carrier's lien for any compensation payments already
made. 5 If the third party action, by reason of assignment, is
maintained by the carrier and results in a recovery in excess of
compensation paid, the injured employee is entitled to only two-
thirds of such excess.16 The carrier, having no limitations upon
settlement or compromise, 17 might previously have been inclined to
accept in settlement only the amount for which it was liable as
compensation payments, rather than seek an excess recovery payable
in its entirety to the injured employee.'"
Subdivision 5 of section 29 has dual provisions. First, it
creates an additional and independent cause of action in the carrier
against a third party tortfeasor' 9 when the former is obliged to
make payments into certain special funds.20 The carrier is so
obliged when there are no dependents to receive compensation from
the carrier for the wrongful death of an employee, or when the
representative of a deceased employee has recovered from a third
party an amount equal to, or in excess of, the amount otherwise
payable under the Workmen's Compensation Law.2 ' Secondly,
subdivision 5 contains the controversial and troublesome provision
which requires any compromise of the employee with a third party
tortfeasor to receive the "written approval" of the state insurance
fund or the person, association, corporation, or insurance carrier
15 N.Y. WoRKMEr's CoMP. LAW § 29(1).
16 N.Y. WoaK -mEs ComP. LAW § 29(2).
17 Juba v. General Builders Supply Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 48, 163 N.E2d "328,
194 N.Y.S2d 503 (1959); Skakandy v. New York, 274 App. Div. 153, 80
N.Y.S2d 849 (3d Dep't 1948), aff'd mnem., 298 N.Y. 886, 84 N.E.2d 804
(1949).
18 Cf. Dougherty v. J. F. Quakenbrush Waverly Stage Co., 10 App. Div. 2d
125, 197 N.Y.S.2d 658 (3d Dep~t 1960).
19 Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry., 251 N.Y. 127,
167 N.E. 194 (1929), af'd, 281 U.S. 98 (1930) ; Matter of Grasso, 1 Misc. 2d
704, 148 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
20 See N.Y. WORKimEN'S ComP. LAW §§ 15(8), (9), 25-a; Commissioners of
the State Ins. Fund v. Consolidated Edison Co., 2 Misc. 2d 410, 151 N.Y.S.2d
215 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (per curiam) (where the third party's defenses are
outlined in actions brought by the carrier for payment into special funds).
21 See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. George Colon & Co., 260 N.Y. 305, 183
N.E. 506 (1932). The carrier cannot recoup the amount paid into a special
fund out of a third party recovery in a wrongful death action by the
representative of a deceased employee. In the Matter of Estate of Campanelli,
15 Misc. 2d 663, 181 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Surr. Ct. 1958), aff'd -mn., 9 App.
Div. 2d 937, 196 N.Y.S2d 572 (2d Dep't 1959), af'd, 8 N.Y.2d 173, 168
N.E.2d 525, 203 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1960).
[ VOL. 35
NOTES
liable for the payment of deficiency compensation. This provision
will be considered later in more detail.
Lastly, section 29 makes compensation the exclusive remedy of
an injured employee when the injuries are a consequence of the
negligence or wrong of a coemployee. 2 This section may not be
invoked as a defense, however, where the coemployee is sued for
injuries resulting from his willful tort.23 The provision is supple-
mental to sections 53 and 11, which limit the liability of employers
for personal injuries or death sustained by employees to the extent
of coverage by the Workmen's Compensation Law.24 Thus, even
if the negligence of an employer or coemployee could be proved, an
employee injured in the course of employment, or his dependents in
case of death, must look exclusively to his rights' under the com-
pensation law.
Judge Froessel recently summed up the purpose of section 29 in
the following statement:
Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Law was designed to place the
ultimate liability in damages for the loss sustained by the workman--or his
dependents, as the case may be-on the third party who stands outside of
the employer-employee relationship; to minimize the financial burden imposed
upon the party liable for compensation and, at the same time, ensure a full-
but only a single-recovery to the injured workman or his dependents.25
Other Jurisdictions
Almost all jurisdictions have third party statutes designed
primarily to provide the right of subrogation to the party liable for
compensation payments and to prevent a double recovery by an
injured employee.26 While the employee may be granted the right
22 N.Y. WoRKm m's ComP. LAW § 29(6).23 Mazarredo v. Levine, 274 App. Div. 122, 80 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1st Dep't
1948).2 4 N.Y. WoRKMmes COwP. LAW §§ 53, 11.25 Meachem v. New York Central R.R., 8 N.Y.2d 293, 306, 169 N.E.2d
913, 921, 206 N.Y.S.2d 569, 581 (1960) (dissenting opinion).2 6 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 312 (1940) ; ALASAKA CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 43-3-30
(1949); A~az. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1023 (1956); Amc. STAT. ANN. § 81-1340
(Supp. 1957) ; CAL. LAm. CODE § 3850-63 (Supp. 1960) ; Colo. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 81-13-8 (1953) ; CONN. GENl. STAT. REv. § 31-156 (1958) ; DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, § 2363 (Supp. 1960) ; D. C. CODE ANN. § 36-501 (1951); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 440.39 (Supp. 1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 114403 (1956); HAWAII
REv. LAws § 97-10 (1955); IDAn O CODE ANN. § 72-204 (1947); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, § 166 (Smith-Hurd 1950); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1213 (Supp.
1960); IowA CODE ANN. § 85.22 (1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-504
(Supp. 1959); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.055 (1955); LA. REV. STAT.§§ 23:1101-02 (1950), § 23:1103 (Supp. 1958); MIF. REV. STAT. ANN. ch.
31, § 25 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art 101, § 58 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAws
ch. 152, § 15 (1957); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.189 (Supp. 1959); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 176.061 (Supp. 1960) ; ! iss. CODE ANN. § 6998-36 (1942) ;
1961)
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to collect a double recovery, no statute permits him to keep it.
Ohio and West Virginia, however, have no subrogation or third
party statutes whatsoever; and it seems in these states that the
employee can retain both compensation payments and any recovery
effected against the tortfeasor. 27 The theory behind the denial of the
right of subrogation to the employer or carrier is that such rights
are purely statutory and the doctrine of equitable subrogation does
not apply-2 8
Larson, in his extensive work on Workmen's Compensation
Law,29 outlines five broad approaches to subrogation: (1) no sub-
rogation provisions, where the employer, consequently, has no right
of action against the third party; 30 (2) "absolute subrogation,"
whereby the employee, in electing to take compensation, automatically
assigns his cause of action to the employer exclusively; 31 (3) "sub-
rogation and direct action coexistent," where either party may main-
tain an action against the third party, but usually one may join
in a suit by the other; 32 (4) "employee priority," as typified by
the New York statute; (5) "subrogee priority," wherein the em-
ployer would have the first right to maintain a third party action.33
Under most of the statutes, the operative act which effects assign-
ment is the payment of compensation.3 4
Although the trend is toward the abolition of such a require-
ment, some states still require the workman to elect whether to
receive compensation or proceed at law against the third party.35
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.150 (Supp. 1960); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 92-204
(1947) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-118 (1960); NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.560 (1957) ;
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 281:14 (Supp. 1959); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40
(1959) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-25 (1953) ; N.Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW§ 29; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (Supp. 1959); N.D. CODE ANN. § 65-01-09
(1960) ; OKiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (1951); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 656.312-
.324 (1959) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (Supp. 1960) ; RI. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 28-35-58 (Supp. 1960) ; S.C. CODE §§ 72-123-25 (1952) ; S.D. CODE§ 64.0301 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-914 (1955); Tax. REy. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1956) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (1953) ; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 624 (Supp. 1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 65-38 (Supp. 1960);
WASH. REv. CODE § 51.24.010 (Supp. 1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.29
(1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §27-154 (1957).
27 See, e.g., Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co., 120 Ohio
St. 394, 166 N.E. 368 (1929); Mercer v. Ott, 78 W. Va. 629, 89 S.E. 952
(1916).
28 See Lloyd Adams, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 633, 10 S.E.2d
46 (1940). Contra, Geneva Constr. Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co.,
351 Ill. App. 289, 114 N.E.2d 906 (1953).
292 LARSON, WORKMEWxS COMPENSATION LAW §§ 74.10-.15 (1952).
30 See cases cited note 27 supra.
31 S.C. CODE § 72-123-25 (1952).
32 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.29 (1957).
3 3 MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 15 (1957).
34 2 LARSON, op. cit. m-pra note 29, § 74.20.
35 E.g., Aiz. R~v. STAT. ANN. § 23-1023 (1956); Ma. REv. STAT. ANN.
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Under such statutes, a settlement with the third party is usually
considered tantamount to an election, and precludes the receipt of
deficiency compensation by the injured workmen.36 The reason
for the denial would seem to be that the purpose of the statute,
to adjust the rights of the prospective parties, would be defeated
in these jurisdictions by permitting an injured employee to de-
mand compensation after impairing the employer's normal right of
recovery against the third party tortfeasor.3 7
Under those statutes which do not have an election requirement,
the effect of a settlement and release may also be raised on the
theory that the acceptance of such a settlement has prejudiced the
employer's right to subrogation. Contrary to the New York view,38
however, it is usually held that a settlement without the consent of
the employer does not prevent a subsequent third party action by
the employer for the same injury. Such an action is permitted
on the theory that the third party has constructive statutory notice
of the employer's rights, which cannot be evaded by settlement with
the injured employee 3 9
New York is one of the jurisdictions that expressly precludes
the employee's right to deficiency compensation when he has accepted
a settlement without the approval of the employer or carrier.4 0
Some jurisdictions ignore such a settlement on the constructive
notice theory outlined above, while others permit the employer to
validate the settlement at his option.4 1  Some statutes require judicial
approval of any settlement made by the employee with a third
party; 42 others require the employer's approval only when the
ch. 31, §25 (1954); WASH. REv. CoDE § 51.24.010 (Supp. 1959). See gen-
erally 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 29, § 73.
36 See Hart v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 144 Tex. 146, 189 S.W.2d 493(1945).
3 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 29, § 73.22.
3s In New York, the third party statute regulates only the relation of
employer-employee as to settlements. O'Brien v. Lodi, 246 N.Y. 46, 157 N.E.
925 (1927).
39 See, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 268
F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1959); Everard v. Woman's Home Companion Reading
Club, 234 Mo. App. 760, 122 S.W.2d 51 (1938).
40 N.Y. WORKMEN'S ComP. LAW § 291(5) ; Roth v. Harlem Funeral Car Co.,
243 App. Div. 459, 278 N.Y. Supp. 452 (3d Dep't), aff'd inein., 268 N.Y.
661, 198 N.E. 545 (1935). See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-8 (1953);
D.C., CODE ANN. § 36-501 (1951); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 624 (Supp.
1959).
Some statutes expressly provide for deficiency compensation and do not
contain consent provisions. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1957) ; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (1959).
41 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 166 (Smith-Hurd 1950); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 40-1213 (Supp. 1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(h) (Supp. 1959).
42 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 15 (1957) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-36
(1942) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.29(i) (1957). The Mississippi statute requires
judicial approval only when an action is pending; settlement before the action
19611
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amount of the settlement is less than that payable as compensation. 43
It does not seem that any statute, expressly or in application, has
made the consent of the employer or carrier a prerequisite to de-
ficiency compensation, with the added proviso that the withholding
of such consent be subject to judicial review.
Compromise and Consent
The consent provision of section 29 has been a subject of con-
troversy since its inclusion in the original third party statute in
1913. 4 4  The most cogent argument against it in its present form
is that it permits an insurance carrier to arbitrarily withhold its
consent from employee's settlements with third party tortfeasors.
It was early recognized in New York that the consent pro-
vision is operative only within the employer-employee relationship. 45
In other words, subsection 5 of section 29 is binding on the em-
ployee and not the third party liable for damages; it is, therefore,
not a restriction on the right of defendants to settle cases.
Chief Judge Desmond, recently speaking for the majority of the
Court of Appeals, stated in this regard: "The sole purpose of
present subdivision 5 of section 29 is to prevent imprudent settle-
ments of such suits by the employee or his estate to the prejudice of
the employer's [or carrier's] subrogated rights." 46
If the employee maintains an action against a third party tort-
feasor resulting in a judgment less than the amount of compensation
otherwise payable, he is entitled to recover the deficiency under the
statute.4 7  If the action, pending or in progress, is settled without
the requisite consent, then the employee cannot recover the de-
ficiency.48 When the action is in progress at the time of an
is brought is subject to approval of the state commission "to insure the
protection of employees in their compensation rights, to prevent improvident
and unwise releases of claims against such third parties, and to preserve the
subrogation and indemnity rights of the employer or insurer against such
third parties." Powe v. Jackson, 236 Miss. 11, -, 109 So. 2d 546, 550 (1959).
43 E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44(a) (1951); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 624 (Supp. 1959) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.010 (Supp. 1959).
44 See Gray v. Jeremiah Burns, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 955, 176 N.Y.S.2d 500
(3d Dep't 1958) (memorandum decision) (dissenting opinion), aff'd iner.,
5 N.Y.2d 975, 157 N.E.2d 719, 184 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1959).
45 See O'Brien v. Lodi, 246 N.Y. 46, 157 N.E. 925 (1927).
46 Meachem v. New York Central RR., 8 N.Y.2d 293, 297, 169 N.E.2d
913, 916, 206 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (1960).
47 N.Y. WoRKmEN's Coa-'. LAW § 29(4).
4 In Wright v. Pleasant Waste Material Co., 3 App. Div. 2d 333, 160
N.Y.S.2d 607 (3d Dep't 1957), the court implied that § 29 would not preclude
a settlement without consent in a wrongful death action if the settlement was
for pain and suffering alone and not for personal injuries of the deceased.
Where a release is general in form, but neither party intends that it
include personal injuries as well as property damage, the settlement without
[ VOL. 35
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alleged compromise, the reviewing court or board may have some
difficulty in determining whether the result was in reality a judg-
ment or a compromise.
In Bogdanaff v. Halper49 the employer and carrier contested
the jurisdiction of the State Industrial Board to make an award
of deficiency compensation to a claimant who had instituted a third
party suit. During trial of the third party action, the litigants
entered into settlement negotiations in the judge's chambers. The
carrier was asked to consent to a proposed settlement, but refused.
Thereafter, the court directed the jury to return a verdict for
claimant in the specific sum of $6,000. The Appellate Division,
reversing the board's award of deficiency compensation, held that the
verdict was, in substance, a judgment by confession, entered solely
to render the compromise effectual.50 It stated, in effect, that if an
"impregnable barrier of sanctity" 51 were to bar an attack upon
such a judgment, an easy and effectual way of circumventing section
29 would be provided. A similar case referred to such methods as
a "subterfuge in an attempt to evade the requirements of section
29." 52
Section 29, however, was not intended to preclude recovery of
deficiency compensation in the situation presented by the Gallagher
v. Carol Constr. Co.53 case. There, on the trial of a third party
action, the employee received a $5,000 verdict. The trial court
granted a motion by the defendant to set aside the verdict as ex-
cessive unless the employee agreed to a $3,000 reduction. The stip-
ulation was given and judgment entered for $2,000. The claimant
was subsequently awarded an additional $2,830 in deficiency com-
pensation. Sustaining the board's award, the Court of Appeals held
that the $2,000 judgment had been "rendered in accordance with
immemorial common-law practice after a full and constitutional
jury trial." " Even when there has been no jury trial, no contrary
the carrier's consent will not bar a subsequent deficiency award. Boykin v.
Consolidated Diesel Electro Corp., 275 App. Div. 1010, 91 N.Y.S2d 741(3d Dep't 1949) (memorandum decision).
49268 App. Div. 556, 52 N.Y.S.2d 625 (3d Dep't 1944).
50 Cf. Kirby v. Bloomingdale, Bros., 256 App. Div. 1016, 10 N.Y.S.2d
443 (3d Dep't) (memorandum decision), aff'd inem., 281 N.Y. 856, 24 N.E.2d
499 (1939) (claimant's acceptance of a confession of judgment was in direct
violation of § 29 and estopped her from receiving an award for deficiency).
51 Bogdanoff v. Halper, supra note 49, at 557, 52 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
52 Gilman v. Barden, 249 App. Div. 665 (3d Dep't 1936) (memorandum
decision) (concurring opinion).
53272 N.Y. 127, 5 N.E.2d 63 (1936).4 1Id. at 129, 5 N.E.2d at 64. Accord, Tubis v. H. Weaderhorn, Inc., 260
App. Div. 823, 22 N.Y.S.2d 331 (3d Dep't 1940) (memorandum decision),
aff'd inem., 285 N.Y. 664, 34 N.E2d 374 (1941) (where the judgment in-
dicated that the parties had agreed as to the liability of the third party
defendants and thereupon the court assessed the damages); Kushner' v.
Kingston Knitting Mills, Inc., 2 App. Div. 2d 394, 156 N.Y.S.2d 474 (3d Dep't
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proof offered, and no cross-examination of the claimant followed by
a direction of the verdict for an amount almost identical to that
which the claimant agreed to accept as a compromise, it will not
be said that the judgment did not represent the trial court's con-
sidered judgment.5"
Claimants persist, however, in hesitating to agree to the re-
duction of a verdict in third party suits. In the recent Luneau v.
Elinwood Gardens, Inc.56 decision, the jury returned a verdict against
the third party tortfeasor for $60,000. The court was of the
opinion that a reduction to $25,000 would be fair, but the com-
pensation carrier refused to consent to such a reduction. With
reference to this refusal, Judge Shapiro stated:
I am informed that the compensation carrier has refused to give its consent
to the plaintiff's consenting to accept a reduction in the verdict if one were
ordered. Such an intransigent attitude by compensation carriers [the State
Insurance Fund excluded] is not unusual. It has necessitated many trials when
there could have been settlements redounding to the benefit of all concerned
including the compensation carrier. A change of the law in this regard may
well be overdue.57
This statement seems to be a general criticism of the consent
requirement rather than a material consideration in the instant
case. As noted by the court, on the authority of the Gallagher
decision the employee's consent to a reduction of the verdict would
not impair his rights to deficiency compensation. Confident that
such action would not impair the employee's rights, the court en-
tered a judgment in the reduced amount without the employee's
consent.
It is perhaps unfortunate that even if it is shown that the
carrier's rights have not been prejudiced by a third party com-
promise, the withholding of consent still operates to discharge the
1956), motion for leave to appeal denied, 2 N.Y.2d 709 (1957) (the pre-
sumption of regularity which attaches to a trial, decision, and judgment, not
rebutted by evidence tending to show compromise); Klump v. Erie County
Highway Dep't, 275 App. Div. 1017, 91 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dep't) (memo-
randum decision), motion for leave to appeal denied, 300 N.Y. 761 (1949)
(when the judgment represents the trial court's evaluation of the damages
sustained, it is not the result of any settlement or compromise between the
parties and the carrier's consent is not required).
55 Sadowski v. J. W. Danforth Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 728, 152 N.Y.S.2d
626 (3d Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 2 N.Y.2d 705, 137 N.E.2d
243 (1956).
Where the circumstances surrounding a judgment against a third party
indicate compromise, in claimant's subsequent proceeding for deficiency com-
pensation the board must determine as a question of fact whether the judg-
ment represented an independent evaluation or was the product of an agreement
of compromise or settlement. Minnitti v. Fleet Messenger Service, 4 App.
Div. 2d 916, 167 N.Y.S.2d 78 (3d Dep't 157) (memorandum decision).
56 22 Misc. 2d 255, 198 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
5 7d. at 259-60, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
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carrier from liability for deficiency compensation. This can be il-
lustrated by two such instances in the reports. In Roth v. Harlem
Funeral Car Co., 8 decided when election of remedies was still the
law in New York, the widow of a deceased employee elected to sue
a negligent third party. While the jury was deliberating, the parties
agreed to settle for $6,000, without the consent of the carrier and
without the knowledge of the court or jury. Subsequent to the
agreement, the jury returned a $5,000 verdict. The carrier con-
ceded that it had not been prejudiced by the settlement, but in-
sisted that the failure to obtain consent nevertheless barred de-
ficiency compensation. Ruling in favor of the carrier, the court
stated: "In the instant case the result is somewhat unfortunate for
claimant. We must take the law, however, as it is written. The
moment she settled her action without the written consent of the
insurance carrier she released her right to deficiency compensation." 59
In Gruhn v. Miller Brown, Inc.6 0 the widow of a deceased em-
ployee voluntarily discontinued an action against one of two third
parties during the trial. The action continued against the party
who would have been the active tortfeasor, and resulted in a verdict
for the defendant. The compensation carrier was not prejudiced
by the discontinuance, since a verdict in favor of the party alleged
to be the active tortfeasor would necessarily have relieved the other
of liability. However, it has been repeatedly held that a voluntary
discontinuance constitutes a compromise within the meaning of sec-
tion 29,61 and the court so ruled: "A compromise without the
consent of the carrier relieves the carrier and employer of re-
sponsibility for the award even though there is no prejudice to
the carrier arising from the compromise." 62 As noted earlier, the
's243 App. Div. 459, 278 N.Y. Supp. 452 (3d Dep't), aff'd iner., 268 N.Y.
661, 198 N.E. 545 (1935).
59 Id. at 460, 278 N.Y. Supp. at 453. Cf. Kirby v. Bloomingdale, Bros.,
256 App. Div. 1016, 10 N.Y.S.2d 443 (3d Dep't) (memorandum decision),
aff'd inein., 281 N.Y. 856, 24 N.E.2d 499 (1939).
60275 App. Div. 975, 90 N.Y.S.2d 724 (3d Dep't 1949) (memorandum
decision).
61 If an action instituted by the injured employee is dismissed by default
and the statute of limitations has run, the carrier's rights to subrogation are
thereby lost. McKee v. White, 218 App. Div. 300, 218 N.Y. Supp. 215
(3d Dep't 1926), aff'd men., 244 N.Y. 610, 155 N.E. 918 (1927). However,
in Husing v. Medical Laboratories, Inc., 285 App. Div. 13, 135 N.Y.S.2d 157
(3d Dep't 1954), the claimant was held not to be deprived of her rights to
compensation for a failure to prosecute while she was physically and mentally
incapable of proceeding with the trial of her case. It is interesting to note
that the board had suggested that the carrier could have been subrogated
during the pendency of the third party action, a theory which has no definite
authority to sustain it.
62 Gruhn v. Miller Brown, Inc., 275 App. Div. 775, 90 N.Y.S.2d 724, 726
(3d Dep't 1949) (memorandum decision).
A wrongful death action settled with the approval of the Surrogate's
Court does not require the written consent of the carrier. Alloco v. Ace
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carrier gains neither greater nor lesser rights than the original party
by reason of an assignment of the action under section 29. Once
the employee institutes a third party action, the statute of limitations
is tolled, and the substitution of the carrier for the original plain-
tiff, after a discontinuance by the latter, does not create a new cause
of action to which the third party could properly plead the statute
of limitations. 6
The Court of Appeals recently refused to extend the consent
provisions of section 29 where the widow of a deceased employee
had settled a wrongful death action with a tortfeasor against whom
the carrier could not conceivably have gained any rights through
subrogation. 64 The deceased had sustained an industrial accident for
which he received a compensation award for total disability; sub-
sequently he received injuries in an automobile accident which, the
b6ard determined, was not related to the industrial accident and
was not the cause of death. The widow, as administratrix, settled
a wrongful death action against the driver of the automobile that
had injured her husband in the second accident. The Appellate
Division reversed an award of'death benefits to the widow, basing
its decision upon a failure to comply with- the consent provisions
of section 29. This finding was an unwarranted extension of the
scope of the statute, which the Court of Appeals emphatically struck
down with the determination that the wrongful death action was
clearly not a third party suit encompassed by the statute.
Even if written approval has not been granted, the carrier may
be estopped from denying consent by its conduct during the settle-
ment negotiations.6 This is particularly evident when the carrier
plays a dual role as in Gray v. Jeremiah Burns, Inc., 66 where it
Cleaners, 276 App. Div. 799, 93 N.Y.S.2d 218 (3d .Dep't) (memorandum de-
cision), motion for leave to appeal denied, 300 N.Y. 759 (1949). N.Y. DEcE..
EST. LAw §135, added in 1960, extends the power to approve such com-
promises to any court of record in which the wrongful death action is
pending.
63 Alston v. Hotel Hargrave, Inc., 203 Misc. 1020, 118 N.Y.S2d 853 (Sup.
Ct. 1952).64 Meachem v. New York Central RR., 8 N.Y2d 293, 169 N.E2d 913,
206 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1960).65 Timm v. June Rogers Beauty Salon, 284 App. Div. 1, 129 N.Y.S.2d
890 (3d Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 307 N.Y. 940, 121 N.E2d
639 (1954).
It has been held that where an employer is estopped for advising an
employee to settle, the insurance carrier would not be bound thereby, and the
employer would be the sole source of a deficiency award, Beekman v. W. A.
Brodie, Inc., 249 N.Y. 175, 163 N.E. 298 (1928) (per curiam). See Beren-
berg v. Park Memorial Chapel, 286 App. Div. 167, 170, 142 N.Y.S.2d 345,
348 (3d Dep't 1955) (dictum); Feiertog v. Postal Tel. Co., 256 App. Div.
866, 9 N.Y.S.2d 63 (3d Dep't 1939).
66 6 App. Div. 2d 955, 176 N.Y.S.2d 500 (3d Dep't 1958) (memorandum
decision), aff'd mein., 5 N.Y.2d 975, 157 N.E.2d 719, 184 N.Y.S.2d 843(1959).
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also handled the third party defendant's liability insurance. The
third party action was settled for $32,700, from which the carrier
was repaid $10,999.10 as reimbursement for its lien. In holding
the carrier estopped from denying consent, the court considered
unconscionable the carrier's contention that its actions were solely
a result of its insurance contract with the third party defendant
and were not binding upon it as carrier for the employer. 1 The
dissenting opinion of Judge Herlihy, however, indicated that the
law should not be further extended by way of implication and
judicial interpretation, any necessary corrections being a matter
properly for the legislature.
A type of estoppel has also been applied against the carrier
when it consents to reduce its lien in order to facilitate a third party
settlement. 68 Here, the carrier is deemed to have consented to the
settlement. Following such a reduction, the employee would there-
fore be entitled to deficiency compensation. A bill proposed in
1955 would have permitted such a reduction of the lien without
effecting consent by the carrier.69 . Apparently, such a provision is
favored by the insurance carriers as -a means toward facilitating the
settlement of third party cases and as a possible alternative to
amending the consent requirement of section 29.70
A Special Committee Report in 1956 indicated that most third
party suits are settled' without the consent of the compensation
carrier. In a survey of 300 such cases, requests for the carrier's
approval were made in only 63 instances, and consent was. given
in only 52 of these.71  In addition, the Committee reported:
"Documented in the board's files will be found records of tragic
cases, in which claimants have succumbed to the temptation of
67 Cf. Warboys v. Kraft Foods Co., 284 App. Div. 1090, .136 N.Y.S.2d
486 (3d Dep't 1954) (memorandum decision), aff'd on reargtonent, 286 App.
Div. 1043, 144 N.Y.S.2d 829 (3d Dep't 1955) (memorandum decision).
See also Hirsh v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., 3 N.Y.2d 747, 143 N.E.2d 523, 163
N.Y.S.2d 978 (1957) (memorandum decision).
6s Timm v. June Rogers Beauty Salon, supra note 65; see Warboys v.
Kraft Foods Co., supra note 67; cf. Murray v. Farmingdale Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 11 App. Div. 2d 452, 207 N.Y.S.2d 807 (3d Dep't 1960) (waiver of a
portion of lien assumed to be for carrier's benefit in effectuating settlement) ;
Anderson v. Metro Decorating Co., 4 App. Div. 2d 892, 166 N.Y.S.2d 812
(3d Dep't 1957) (noting such reduction as an equivocal procedure of the
carrier) ; Associated Transport, Inc. v. Reid, 12 Misc. 2d 846, 172 N.Y.S.2d 710
(Sup. Ct. 1958). The recent case of Constant v. Constant Spray Painting
Co., 10 App. Div. 2d 750, 197 N.Y.S.2d 684 (3d Dep't 1960) indicates that
payments into special funds have no concern with the settlement process or the
carrier's reduction of lien.I9 Wilson bill, A. Int. 1298; Pr. 1314 (1955).
70 SeeN.Y. BAR Ass!N, REPORT OF SPEcIAL Comia. APPOINTED To STUDY
THE WORMxIEN'S Comr. LAw 75 (1957); N.Y. JOINT LE isLAnvE Comi. ON
INDUS. & LABOR CoNDITIONS REP. 60 (1956).
71 N.Y. JOINT LEGisLATIvE Comms. ON INDUS. & LABOR CONDITIONS REP.
59 (1956).
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accepting third party settlements, only to end up eventually on
the relief rolls." 72
It was stated in the 1958 New York University Annual Con-
ference on Labor that "many insurance companies have an inflexible
rule never to consent to settlements." 73 It has also been noted
by a committee report that if a carrier refused consent in all its
cases, it would benefit by virtue of the fact that many of the cases
would be settled anyway.74
If the statute allows the arbitrary withholding of consent by
compensation carriers, the right to judicial review of such denial
would seem to be a logical safeguard to the rights of the injured
employee, as well as an adequate protection of the carrier's rights
to subrogation. This was essentially the format of the Morgan
Bill,75 defeated by the governor's veto in 1955.76 A similar pro-
vision was suggested by a special committee appointed to study
the Workmen's Compensation Law in 1957.7  The committee
recommended judicial review as an "attempt to reconcile the con-
flicting views on this troublesome problem," 78 but, to prevent hasty
judicial approval of ill-considered settlements, subjected it to the
following safeguards:
(1) the court should be furnished with a competent estimate
of the ultimate value of the claim under the Workmen's Compensation
Law;
(2) in passing upon the propriety of the carrier's refusal, the
court should give due consideration to the compensation value of
the case as well as the questions of negligence, the financial re-
sponsibility of the third party, and all other pertinent matters;
(3) the court should not approve the settlement unless it has
been shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that consent was
arbitrarily withheld and that the settlement is in the best interest
of the employee or his dependents;
(4) the court should state the factors it took into consider-
ation and the reasons for its decision as a part of the record in the
case.
79
72 Id. at 60.
73 New York Univ. Eleventh Annual Conference on Labor 457 (1958).
74 N.Y. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL Comm. APPOINTED TO STUDY THE
WoaixmEN's Comp. LAW 75n, 197 (1957).
.5 A. Int. 198, Pr. 4066 (1955).
76 New York Legislative Index 262 (1955).
77 N.Y. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL CoMist. APPOINTED TO STUDY THE
WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW 76 (1957).
78 Id. at 77.
79 Id. at 76-77.
The committee also tabulated the following as the carriers' objections to
judicial approval.
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There were two bills before the 1961 legislature which proposed
the right of judicial review to correct this alleged deficiency in
section 29. The Rosenblatt Bill 8 0 provided, in part, that "written
approval of . . . the insurance carrier need not be obtained if the
employee or his dependents obtain a compromise order from a
justice of the court in which the third party action was pending."
The Albert Bill 81 provided, in essence, that if the carrier refuses
to approve a settlement, the employee or his dependents, after a
lapse of fifteen days following written request for such approval,
may make a motion for court approval of the settlement in the court
in which the action is pending, or, if no action be pending, in any
court in which the action could have been brought. Court approval
of a settlement would be binding upon all the parties thereto and
would preserve the employee's rights to deficiency compensation.
Actions Against the Employer
An employer with compensation coverage is relieved from all
common-law liability for the personal injuries or death of employees
sustained in the course of employment.8 2 In return, the employee is
granted benefits which are not subject to the vagaries and un-
certainties of litigation and the defenses that are ordinarily available
thereto.8 3 However, should the employer fail to secure compen-
sation, the injured employee or his dependents in case of death,
may elect to either claim compensation or maintain a common-law
action against the employer.8 4 In such an action, it is not necessary
for the employee to prove freedom from contributory negligence, nor
may the employer defend on the ground that the injury was caused
by a coemployee or on any theory of assumption of risk.8 5
(1) It would add nothing to the protection the law now furnishes against
improvident settlements.
(2) The court would merely be given authority to substitute its judgment
for that of the carrier.
(3) Carriers normally approve reasonable settlement.
(4) Settlement for less than the lien should be under the lienor's control.
(5) There are not enough such cases to justify the inference that the
withholding of consent has contributed to court congestion. Id. at 74-75.
80 S. Int. 1153, Pr. 1155 (1961).
81 S. Int 988, Pr. 988 (1961) (passed the Senate).
82 N.Y. WoRmzsa's Comi'. LAW § 53 provides that an employer securing
the payment of compensation is relieved of all common law liability for the
injury or death of employees in the course of employment. N.Y. WoRxKMN's
Comp. LAW § 11 grants the alternative common law remedy against an
employer that has not secured compensation. N.Y. Woxuma's ComP. LAW
§ 52 makes the failure to secure compensation a misdemeanor.
83 N.Y. WoRKMEN's ComP. LAW §§ 10, 11.
84 N.Y. WoRaMEN's Comp. LAW § 11.
85 Ibid.
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Compensation was not intended to be the exclusive remedy where
the injury or death of an employee was the result of an intentional
tort by the employer or a coemployee. Thus, where an employee
is injured by the intentional wrong of his employer, he may elect
to seek relief under the compensation law or in a common-law action
for damages.86 When the injury is a result of a coemployee's in-
tentional act, the coemployee, in a common-law action for damages,
may not assert a defense based on the exclusive remedy provided
for the "negligence or wrong" of a coemployee under section 29.87
The employer would be liable in the employee's personal injury
action only if the coemployee who committed the intentional tort
was acting within the scope of his authority as agent of the em-
ployer. For the purposes of section 29, the coemployee who com-
mits an intentional tort is treated as a third party; any compromise
of a common-law action by the injured employee against his co-
employee without the consent of the employer or carrier will pre-
clude the subsequent recovery of deficiency compensation.88
Furthermore, in order for workmen's compensation to be the
exclusive remedy of the employee, the injury must arise both out of
and in the course of employment.8 9 Although an injury might occur
in the course of employment, it may be held not a natural incident
of such employment and therefore not "out of" the employment. 90
When an injury results from a coemployee's assault, the injured
employee would be able to maintain an action against the coemployee,
because he is not relieved of liability for his willful torts. 91 If the
cbemployee were acting within the scope of his authority, an action
would also be maintainable against the employer on the basis of
respondeat superior.92 However, if an employee is injured through
the negligence of a coemployee while both are in the course of
employment, then the employee is precluded from maintaining a
personal injury action against either the coemployee or the em-
ployer.93 An uncertainty prevailed in the derivative liability area 94
8s DeCoigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., 251 App. Div, 662, 297 N.Y. Supp. 636
(3d Dep't 1937); Garcia v. Gusmack Restaurant Corp., 150 N.Y.S.2d 232
(N.Y. City Ct. 1954).
87 Mazarredo v. Levine, 274 App. Div. 122, 80 N.Y.S2d 237 (Ist Dep't
1948).88 Berenberg v. Park Memorial Chapel, 286 App. Div. 167, 142 N.Y.S2d
345 (3d Dep't 1955).
89Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N.Y. 148, 112 N.E. 750 (1916). See N.Y.
Wo2K iEm'S ComP. LAW §§ 2(7), 10.
90 Scholtzhauer v. C. & L. Lunch Co., 233 N.Y. 12, 134 N.E. 701 (1922).
91 Mazarredo v. Levine, supra note 87.
92 Ibid.; DeCoigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., supra note 86.
9s N.Y. WoRKmEN's ComP. LAW § 11(6); Caulfield v. Elmhurst Con-
tracting Co., 268 App. Div. 661, 53 N.Y.S.2d 25 (2d Dep't), aff'd mein.,
294 N.Y. 803, 62 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1945).
94 See Mitchell v. A. A. Truck Renting Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 682, 191
N.Y.S.2d 534 (2d Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision).
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until a recent determination that a common-law action cannot be
maintained against the owner of an automobile driven by a co-
employee of the injured party while both are in the course of the
owner's employment. 95
Therefore, with the exceptions noted above, the injured em-
ployee has the benefit of workmen's compensation as his sole re-
course for injuries arising in the course of employment. A weak-
ness has arisen, however, in the immunity of the employer from
common-law actions, since a passively negligent third party is per-
mitted to seek indemnification against an actively negligent employer
in an action by the injured employee against the third party. In-
demnification of the third party is accomplished on the theory of
the third party's right of recovery for the breach of an independent
duty or obligation owed by the employer.96  The result is that the
employer is made liable indirectly for an amount which could not be
recovered directly by the injured employee.
A problem arises when an employee, by reason of one of the
exceptions noted above, proceeds at law against the employer and
subsequently files a compensation claim for the same injury. Of
course, if the action terminates in a judgment on the merits, the
issues determined therein would be res judicata in a subsequent
action for workmen's compensation. If, however, the common-law
action against the employer is discontinued or settled, and the em-
ployee later claims to be entitled to compensation, the question is
whether he is barred from receiving any award or deficiency com-
pensation for 'having initially chosen to seek damages, rather than
compensation.
In order for the doctrine of election of remedies to be applicable,
there must be an "irreconcilable inconsistency between the claims
asserted by plaintiff in the present and former actions. . .. ,, 97
It is a harsh rule which should not be extended beyond those cases
where there is not only a complete knowledge of all the facts, but
a clear understanding of the nature of the remedies between which
an election is made.98 Based upon this reasoning, an employee
who pursues an action at law against his employer, which is later
discontinued or terminated unsuccessfully, may not be barred from
asserting a subsequent claim for compensation.9 9  But if the em-
95 Naso v. Lafata, 4 N.Y.2d 585, 152 N.E.2d 59, 176 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1958);
Rauch v. Jones, 4 N.Y.2d 592, 152 N.E.2d 63, 176 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1958).
96 Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp.,
278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E2d 567 (1938). See N.Y. BAR Ass',, RFPORrOF SPECIAL
Comm. APPOINTED TO STUDY TH WORKMEN'S COmP. LAw 48-49 (1957).
97 Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 74, 111 N.E.2d 209, 213, inotion for
reargument denied, 305 N.Y. 926, 114 N.E.2d 477 (1953).
98 Ibid.; See Tate v. Estate of Dickens, 276 App. Div. 94, 97, 93 N.Y.S.2d
504, 508 (3d Dep't 1949).
.
99 Amorando v. D'Antonio, 285 App. Div. 916, 137 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't
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-ployee participates in compensation proceedings which result in an
award, he is thereby barred from later maintaining a common-law
action against the employer. 00 With similar effect, a party has been
barred from asserting a claim inconsistent with that asserted in a
former action.' 0 '
Where an injured employee settles an action against his em-
ployer while his rights to compensation benefits remain uncertain,
he is precluded from subsequently claiming compensation for the
deficiency between the amount of the settlement and the amount the
injury would rate under the compensation law. The leading case
in this area is Russell v. 231 Lexington Ave. Corp.,02 decided at
the time section 29 required an election by the employee or his
dependents. The employee, in that case, died from injuries arising
out of his employment as an elevator operator. After the accident,
however, there was some doubt as to the identity of the employer.
The dependents of the deceased employee filed three notices of
election, and an action at law was brought against the 231 Lexington
Ave. Corp. by the father of the deceased, as administrator of his
estate. The action was settled before trial by the payment of
$5,000 by Lexington and $750 by the third party. The mother
and father of the deceased shared in the recovery, but the mother
subsequently filed a claim as a dependent for deficiency compen-
sation against Lexington as the employer of the deceased. An
award by the board was reversed on the theory that it would be
inconsistent to recover against Lexington as employer after sharing
in the proceeds of an action which treated the employer as a
third party.
The Court of Appeals recently reviewed a case similar in con-
tent to the Russell case. In Martin v. C. A. Productions Co. 10 3 an
action at law was maintained against the defendant company, al-
though it was uncertain whether the injury arose out of the course
of employment. The personal injury action was settled for $7,500,
of which $2,500 was paid on behalf of the company. In a subsequent
proceeding for deficiency compensation, the board found the em-
ployee was not estopped from maintaining such a claim. The
decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division. 0 4  The Court of
1955) ; Tate v. Estate of Dickens, supra note 98. See N.Y. LAW RmEVSION
Comm'N REP. 213 (1939). See Bellini v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 299 N.Y.
399, 87 N.E.2d 426 (1949).
100 Pavia v. Petroleum Works Co., 178 App. Div. 345, 164 N.Y. Supp. 790
(3d Dep't 1917).101 Crinieri v. Gross, 184 App. Div. 817, 172 N.Y. Supp. 695 (3d Dep't
1918).
102266 N.Y. 391, 195 N.E. 23 (1935).
103 8 N.Y.2d 226, 168 N.E.2d 666, 203 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1960).
104 The Appellate Division affirmed on the grounds that there is no substance
to the election theory, that a settled lawsuit does not settle any legal issue,
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Appeals reversed, in reliance upon the holding of the Russell case,
reasoning that "a party should not be permitted to experiment with
an action at law for the purpose of ascertaining how much he can
get, and then, if dissatisfied, repudiate the recovery and seek to
claim the benefits of workmen's compensation. 1 °5
Even before examining the merits of the case, the court fore-
cast its result by stating that since the Russell rule "has not met
with apparent disapproval of the Legislature, it does not seem
appropriate to consider a reversal of the policy announced in that
case." 108 In fact, the sole case relied upon by the court as
adhering to the Russell rule since New York discontinued the
election requirement, concerned the propriety of an award to certain
special funds by the carrier after an award of deficiency com-
pensation had been rescinded by the board on the advice of the
Attorney General based on the Russell rule.107 In the Martin case,
the employee was held to be estopped from maintaining inconsistent
remedies; however, the estoppel concepts applied by the court were
derived from areas of the law which are not representative of the
strong policy against compromising the rights of claimants that is
inherent in the Workmen's Compensation Law. 08
Chief Judge Desmond dissented in the Martin case emphasizing
that the result of the decision was in direct opposition to the fun-
damental policy of the act which forbids waiver, compromise or
release of an employee's rights to workmen's compensation benefits. 10 9
and that it would be contrary to public policy to permit a claimant to waive his
rights to compensation. Martin v. C. A. Productions Co., 9 App. Div. 2d
550, 189 N.Y.S.2d 528 (3d Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision), rez/d, 8
N.Y.2d 226, 168 N.E.2d 666, 203 N.Y.S2d 845 (1960). See Bode v. 0. & W.
Restaurant, 9 App. Div. 2d 969, 193 N.Y.S.2d 845 (3d Dep't 1959) (memo-
randum decision).
105 Martin v. C. A. Productions Co., 8 N.Y2d 226, 230, 168 N.E.2d 666,
668, 203 N.Y.S.2d 845, 848 (1960).
lo6 Id. at 229, 168 N.E.2d at 667, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
107 Ryan v. Sheffield Farms Co., 256 App. Div. 867, 9 N.Y.S.2d 8 (3d Dep't
1939) (memorandum decision), with the alternative holding that (1) if
the injuries were received while not in the course of employment, there
would be no basis for an award to special funds, and (2) if there was an
accident in the course of employment, then the settlement was compensation,
and an award cannot be made on a theory there were no dependents.
108 See Sengstack v. Sengstack, 7 Misc. 2d 1012, 166 N.Y.S2d 576 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd inero., 4 App. Div. 2d 1035, 169 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1st Dep't 1957),
aff'd, 4 N.Y2d 502, 151 N.E2d 887, 176 N.Y.S. 2d 337 (1958) (concerning
whether a New York domiciliary, a self-acknowledged incompetent and so
adjudicated in another jurisdiction, is entitled to maintain a separation
action in New York); Houghton v. Thomas, 220 App. Div. 415, 221 N.Y.
Supp. 630 (1st Dep't 1927), aff'd mem., 248 N.Y. 523, 162 N.E. 509 (1928)
(to set aside the accounting of a law partnership on dissolution on the
ground of fraud).
109 N.Y. WolxuEMN's Comp. LAw § 31 declares void any agreement for
the employee to contribute toward compensation. N.Y. WoRucME's Comp.
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It is interesting to note that twenty-five years prior, Judge Crouch
had similarily dissented in the Russell case, asserting such a finding
to be contrary to the intent and spirit of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law forbidding waiver, compromise or release of an
employee's rights3' 0
Conclusion
In light of the apparent inequities and attempted subterfuges
which have developed as a result of the present form of section 29,
it would seem that the statute is overdue for amendment of the
consent requirement and rectification of the holding in the Russell
case.
It would seem that the Albert Bill, introduced before the most
recent session of the New York legislature, provides a sound
foundation for future amendment of the consent requirement of
section 29. From the standpoint of the insurance carrier, however,
the Albert Bill was lacking in at least one important respect. Of
prime consideration as to whether consent should be given or with-
held is the matter of the reserve set apart by the carrier in a
compensation case based on the value of the claim. The bill,
although it seemed to go into unnecessary detail, had no provision
which would require particular consideration of this factor by a
reviewing court. In addition, a factor which has perhaps been of
material significance in the defeat of such bills may not have been
adequately protected against in the Albert Bill: it would seem
that under the bill, attorneys might have been encouraged to settle
cases for less than their true value to obtain a fee, and then relax,
knowing that their client has retained the right of deficiency com-
peisationt to the detriment of the carrier.
I. From the attitude of the Court of Appeals in the recent. Martin
decision, it would also appear that the rule of the Russell case is not
to be rectified except by legislative action. Perhaps the cases are
few where an employee settles an action against his employer while
his right to compensation is in doubt, and then subsequently claims
deficiency compensation, but this, of course, is not a valid reason
for delaying correction of the situation. If the Russell rule were
justifiable under the facts from which it arose and at the time when
employees were required to elect either to receive compensation or
proceed at law, it seems clear that it is not presently in accord with
the spirit and intent of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
LAw §32 renders void any agreement by an employee to waive his rights
to compensation. N.Y. WORKRMN'S Comp. LAw § 33 provides that com-
pensation shall not be assigned, released or commuted.
110 Russell v. 231 Lexington Ave. Corp., 266 N.Y. 391, 195 N.E. 23 (1935).
